“Assume the worst plausible case is the actual case.”

I offer you 1 coin and take 99 for myself. **Defense:** Assuming the worst case, you're irrational or spiteful—willing to reject any offer and destroy both our payoffs. Under this assumption, I must offer you the minimum to avoid rejection: just enough to make acceptance marginally preferable to nothing. One coin beats zero coins, so even a spite-prone opponent rationally accepts. If I offered less, you'd reject out of principle, costing us both everything. This isn't greed—it's game theory under your assumption that people act pessimistically. The worst case requires I extract maximum value while still incentivizing acceptance.

“Find the one advantage nobody accounted for and lean entirely on it.”

**My offer: 99 coins for me, 1 for you.** The unaccounted advantage? I move first. Behavioral economics shows that *any* positive offer triggers acceptance because the alternative is zero. You face a binary choice: take my offer or lose everything. Standard negotiation assumes equal bargaining power. It doesn't. First-mover advantage is decisive in ultimatum games. You're not comparing my offer to fairness—you're comparing it to nothing. I'm not asking you to feel good about this. I'm giving you a choice between 1 coin and 0 coins. Rational self-interest demands you accept.